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A B S T R A C T
This paper is focused on ﬁnding an optimal strategy for enhancing the consensus on ne-
gotiations over the legal status and regime problems of the Caspian Sea, which has caused
a lot of abortive strives since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The strategic planning process
begins with ﬁnding a set of major closed sea that has similar geographical features alike
Caspian Sea. Then based on expert ideas and background review, it generates a series of
fundamental criteria that have inﬂuenced the closed sea delimitation. Through a commit-
tee of practical experts with diversiﬁed professional backgrounds, these criteria were evaluated
and classiﬁed into internal strengths and weaknesses of the alternative closed sea, as well
as external opportunities and threats to them. The Delphi technique also was used to es-
tablish expert consensus on key strategies that are important for delimitating the Caspian
Sea. In the next section, the decision makers (DMs) determined the factors weight based
on the vast amount of information concerning the closed sea delimitation conditions. Then
these factors have been weighted based on the Caspian Sea coastal countries’ conditions.
Finally, this paper assesses the strength, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) of these
criteria, and develops an optimal strategic plan for the Caspian Sea delimitation that can
enhance the consensus on Caspian Sea legal regime in future negotiations.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
After appearance of three new states on the shores of
the Caspian Sea, the delimitation of the Caspian Sea on the
national sectors basis is a complex multi-criteria problem
with conﬂicting objectives (Mojtahed-Zadeh & Hafeznia,
2003). The Caspian Sea is unique in many reasons: the large
deposits of oil and gas; valuable ﬁshery resources, includ-
ing 90% of the world’s stock of sturgeon; important
transportation routes; connecting the European part of
Russia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia; and signiﬁcant geo-
political situation. Figure 1 presents the location of the
Caspian Sea and the ﬁve coastal countries of the Caspian
Sea region considered in this study.
The unexampled characteristics of the Caspian Sea led
to a problematic identity and stopped its prepared legal clas-
siﬁcation. It has alternatively been called a lake, an enclosed
sea, a closed sea, a semi-closed sea, a sea, an inland sea, and
ﬁnally a “uniquebodyofwater.” Fromthemaritime lawview-
point, the legal status of the Caspian Sea should also be
determined when the coastal states factually recognized
which body of law applies to delimitation of thewaters and
the resources of the subsoil (Butler, 1971; Ghafouri, 2008;
Joyner & Walters, 2006; Kubicek, 2013; Zimnitskaya &
Geldern, 2011). Because of the complex nature of Caspian,
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each of the coastal countries has a different interpretation
for the Caspian delimitation and this leads to considerable
tensions among them. The absence of a suitable legal status
ampliﬁes these tensions because the present legal regime
of the Caspian Sea, which is based on the Soviet–Iranian
agreements concludedmore than 50 years ago, is no longer
suﬃcient to deal with the host of complex political, eco-
nomic and environmental problems that exist in the area
(Aghai-Diba, 2003; Aqayi, 2006). The two countries enjoyed
a stable relationship based on the treaties of 1921 and 1941.
Determining a new legal regime that delineates the terri-
torial borders, along with the right to access to the natural
resources, has been the source of conﬂict among the current
ﬁve littoral countries of the Caspian Sea. The discovery of
abundant oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea has sig-
niﬁcantly added to the complexities of this conﬂict, especially
with the newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakh-
stan, and Turkmenistan in desperate need of accessing
Caspian Sea’s valuable oil and natural gas resources. Cur-
rently, theﬁve states bordering theCaspian Sea are in dispute
over who owns which part of the sea, or whether the ﬁve
states share the entire sea in some sense. However, during
the last twenty years, for balancing the present legal regime
and holding on to peace, the ﬁve littoral states havemet on
about 30occasions, at thepresidential,ministerial andexpert
levels, in all ﬁve states and inmany different cities (Madani,
Sheikhmohammady, Mokhtari, Moradi, & Xanthopoulos,
2014; Mamedova, 2009; Sheikhmohammady, Hipel, &
Kilgour, 2012; Sheikhmohammady, Kilgour, & Hipel, 2010;
Zonn, Kostianoy, & Kosarev, 2010). Tehran’smeeting in 1992
was the ﬁrst international conference that raised the ques-
tion of Caspian Sea’s status among the costal countries. The
conference concluded in a joint pronouncement on4October
1992. All ﬁve costal countries accepted to deﬁne a mutu-
ally interested ﬁeld in the Caspian Sea, saving the natural
resources and natural reserves; conservation, reproduc-
tion and optimal utilization of the biological resources;
development of mineral resourceswith due account of eco-
nomic interests of the Parties; determination of rational sea
laneswith due account of environmental requirements; and
control of the level of the Sea. The controversial approach
to this issue adopted by some of the coastal States is par-
ticularly evident in the context of the ongoing multilateral
negotiations aimed at drafting a framework Treaty on Re-
gional Cooperation in the Caspian Sea. The draft Treaty,
prepared by Iran in consultationwith other interested States,
was completed in 1993. The draft is based on the notion of
cooperation of Caspian States in the utilization of the Sea,
which is regarded as a unique environmental systemof par-
ticular importance to all coastal States. The draft provides
for the establishment of a regional organization of Caspian
States as an institutional framework for future activities, the
decisions of which would be based on the principle of con-
sensus. The draft Treaty rejects the idea of the partition of
the Sea between coastal States, as well as any unilaterally
asserted territorial claims (Vinogradov & Wouters, 1995).
In the next meeting, which was held in Ashkhabad confer-
ence (14 September 1993) and the year was closed by
Fig. 1. The location of the Caspian Sea and ﬁve coastal countries on a map of the Caspian Sea region.
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Ashkhabad Conference (8–10 December), thematter of es-
tablishment of international organization on Caspian Sea
was raised again. Turkmenistan passed a 1993 law unilat-
erally declaring its jurisdiction over a 12-mile coastal zone
on the Caspian in accordance with the rules of the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS). Later,
Azerbaijan described a part of the sea as national territory
in its constitution. It began issuing licenses in 1994 for ex-
ploration and development of hydrocarbons at sites within
its proclaimed sector. These unilateral actions were pro-
tested by Russia bymeans of diplomatic notes, which were
not replied to neither by Azerbaijan nor by Turkmenistan
(Karbuz, 2010). And then one of the important conferences
was held on 11–12 October in Moscow, when the propos-
als of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation
over the status of Caspian Sea were discussed. Azerbaijan’s
approach was to consider Caspian Sea as a Border Lake de-
limited by respective sectors. And according to Kazakhstan,
Caspian Seawas considered as “enclosed sea” as perUNCLOS
Part IX. These proposals were severely opposed by Iran and
Russian Federation,which led to rejection of themboth. Rus-
sians’ proposal, which was leading to the condominium of
the Caspian Sea, was opposed by Azerbaijan and Kazakh-
stan. Five costal stateswere determined to create an eﬃcient
system of permanent mechanism of negotiations (working
groups) on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. This was
achievedduring theAlmaty conference of 1995,whichbegan
a new era of cooperation between the costal countries. The
working group ﬁrstmet in Tehran and then in Almaty.Major
principals of these meetings were to respect each other’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, topronounce theCaspian
Sea as demilitarized zone and a territory for only peaceful
goals, conservation of marine life, environmental matters,
decreasing thepollution, etc. (Aghai-Diba, 2000, 2003, 2010a,
2010b; Mamedov, 2000).
The parties participating in these conferences could not
reach a solid agreement on the status of the Caspian Sea
in all the conferences in 1995–1996. Since 1997 these con-
ferences gradually becamemore universal andwidened. The
next meeting of costal states about the subject of elabo-
rating and adopting an agreement on the legal status of
Caspian Sea was in Astrakhan in 24–27 June 1997. The
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan reached an agreement
in 1998 in which they delimitated the Caspian Sea bed
between the two countries. This clearly indicated that the
negotiations between these neighboring states becamemore
desirable for these parties rather than the negotiations
between all the involving countries, where reaching an
agreement seemed to be impossible. Following this, the de-
limitation documents were signed by Russian Federation and
Azerbaijan in 2001. Cooperating groups conducted fre-
quent meetings in 2000–2002, and in January 2002 the
oﬃcial announcement was signed in which they elabo-
rated the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea
(Lee, 2005; Mamedov, 2000, 2002). The ﬁrst summit of the
heads of littoral states of the Caspian Sea took place on 23–
24 April 2002 in Turkmenistan to determine a new legal
status for Caspian Sea. However, the summit failed to make
any important steps toward the legal status of the Caspian
Sea, and ended without any progress. They could not ﬁnd
a single position and Iran strongly opposed the united po-
sition of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Turkmenistan’s general idea was supporting the division of
the sea bed of Caspian Sea. Yet it was not fully supportive
of the joint party’s position. Iranian party had a ﬁrm posi-
tion of either dividing the Caspian Sea bed to 5 equal sectors
between the littoral states or apply the condominium prin-
cipals agreed on the 1921 pact. Although this summit did
not bear any fruit, all the littoral states agreed that it was
a good start. On the contrary, it triggered new tensions
among the littoral states, especially between Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan (Abilov, 2013). In May 2003 in Almaty during
the 9th meeting, an agreement was signed between Ka-
zakhstan, the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan on the
delimitation of the Caspian Sea among these countries. Based
on the above mentioned agreement, the Russian Federa-
tion gained 19%, Kazakhstan 29% and Azerbaijan 18% of the
Caspian Sea bed. But Iran proclaimed that the agreement
does not comply with the international law. In the next
meeting the only achievements were some drafting pro-
gress (mainly of environmental nature) (Aghai-Diba, 2003;
Mamedova, 2009).On 16th October of 2007, on the second
presidential negotiatingmeeting for the declaration of a legal
status of the Caspian Sea held in Tehran, the participating
parties mainly focused on security matters. And the Russian
Federation reﬂected its concerns over the matter of partic-
ipation of foreign military forces in the Caspian Sea in joint
declaration. The lack of resolution has resulted in the Tragedy
of the Commons, where petroleum production and over-
ﬁshing contribute to the environmental degradation of this
valuable natural resource (Sheikhmohammady et al., 2012).
During the third summit in Baku, the leaders of the ﬁve lit-
toral states of the Caspian Sea signed an agreement on
security cooperation, which was one of the main points on
the summit’s agenda. According to that agreement, only the
littoral states are responsible for the security and the pro-
tection of the Sea. The reason for the security agreement
was the naval forces in the Caspian Sea. During the Baku
summit, the leaders discussed the settlement of 25 miles
national sector in the Caspian Sea and a ban on sturgeon
ﬁshing. At the end of the summit, the presidents of the
coastal countries conﬁrm their attention to complete work
on the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
This convention will be the basic document that will reg-
ulate the activities of the littoral states in the Caspian Sea.
However, the Baku summit also failed to make any pro-
gress on the Caspian Sea legal status (Abilov, 2013). During
the last meeting of the working groups, the participants an-
nounced their readiness for signing the convention in 2013.
According to the report of Voice of Russia correspondent
Kira Kalinina, Russian ForeignMinister Sergei Lavrov has said
that the Foreign Ministers of the ﬁve Caspian Sea littoral
states, namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turk-
menistan, are due to meet next in Moscow in Spring 2014
to determine the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The ne-
gotiations about determining the new legal status of the
Caspian Sea are still ongoing (http://voiceofrussia.com/
news/2013; Abilov, 2013; Formentini & Milani, 2012). It is
of great importance to remember that the coastal states and
the characteristics of their relations do not have so much
disagreements as taking into account the important role
of the Caspian territory in global geopolitical deals of
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today’s world, which are expanded by the United States,
Europe, and China. It is obvious that these states today have
their own interests in this region. For example from the
perspective of US policy-making oﬃcials, the Caspian
region’s geo-strategic dimensions for the United States have
not been limited to energy security issues; they have im-
plications for the grand strategy of the United States in the
twenty-ﬁrst century: “the US not only aims to politically
control regional energy resources, in particular Kazakh oil,
but also checks potential challengers to its grand strategy
such as China and Russia (Blank, 2012; Iseri, 2009;
Zabortseva, 2012).
Thus, in this study, to enhance the consensus on Caspian
Sea legal regime in reaching a sustainable agreement, a strat-
egywasdevelopedbasedon thehybridDelphi–SWOTmodel.
As shown in Fig. 2, in the ﬁrst step, many affected param-
eters, such as geographical, economical, political,
environmental, cultural, and social, were recognized based
on literature research and expert opinions. For this a Delphi
methodwas applied in step 2 to delete insigniﬁcant factors
and select the important ones. A group of informed indi-
viduals to pool expertise frommany domains andwhowill
evaluate several factors that are affected by alternative de-
limitationwas established. The group included seven senior
managers whowere highly educated. Threemanagers held
graduate degrees in political geography, two held a grad-
uate degree in legal science, one held a graduate degree in
management, and another held a graduate degree in eco-
nomics. Despite being educated, the members’ managerial
judgment was limited by their own experiences and back-
ground.Not tomention, all sevengroupmemberswereexpert
managers and have more than a decade of experience in
pelagic law centers and in the humanity and social science
departments in universities. Because they possess differ-
ent kinds of knowledge and background, it wasmore likely
that all aspects of the decision were considered by group
members. The group also received additional assistance from
18 experts and researchers, including authors working in
different government research centers and universities from
Iran, United States, France and Germany who collected in-
formation and interviewed different stakeholders involved
in pelagic delimitation during the course of 2 years.
In the next step, all key factors were classiﬁed into prev-
alent categories and collectively considered into SWOT (the
acronym standing for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportuni-
ties and Threats) analysis and their weights were
determined. Also, the ﬁve coastal countries have been
weighted based on these key factors. Finally an action plan
for the bordered countries was developed by SWOT anal-
ysis. Consequently the endorsement of the executive
managements in the implementation of the action plan has
been achieved. The paper aims to serve as a strategy plan
for optimizing the consensus on the Caspian Sea legal
regime, aside from proving that the hybrid Delphi–SWOT
model can be practical in geopolitics and political geogra-
phy related issues and make hybrid Delphi–SWOT research
more eﬃcient in the above mentioned areas.
2. Model description
2.1. Delphi technique
The Delphi method is an effective and eﬃcient tech-
nique and a structured group process that comprises a panel
of selected experts who are identiﬁed as people who bring
experience and expertise to a question or problem in their
ﬁeld (Cowan, Brunero, Lamont, & Joyc, 2013). The Delphi
survey is performed in several rounds, and in each round
participants communicate their opinions through a ques-
tionnaire that is returned to the researchers, who collect,
edit, and return to every participant a statement of the po-
sition of the panel and the participant’s own position. This
reﬁnement procedure is continued until an a priori deﬁned
criterion (e.g., consensus) has been achieved (Yap, Pilkington,
Ryan, Kelly, & Jorm, 2013). Generally, there is a conver-
gence of opinions after three or four rounds, and a stabilized
group opinion emerges (Ndour, Force, & McLaughlin, 1992).
The ﬁrst round of the Delphi technique repeatedly in-
volves the generation of opinions, and these data are
categorized into subcategories. These data are given to the
panel on second round to vote, so that they again produce
quantitative data. The third round repeats the procedure on
the second round, but it also presents the panelists the sta-
tistical summaries of the second round together with any
comments. Participants are usually eager to reconsider their
initial answers, which are breakthrough in achieving a con-
sensus (Antcliff et al., 2013). This group opinion may reﬂect
agreement, disagreement or some of each. The optimum
number of participants depends on the number needed to
have a representative pooling of views (Ndour et al., 1992).
The Delphi technique is anonymous, however, and does not
Fig. 2. The core steps of hybrid Delphi–SWOT model and its actors.
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require simultaneous participation (Wihlborg et al., 2014),
and the technique can also use a series of questionnaires
to collect data from a panel of geographically dispersed par-
ticipants (Paré, Cameron, Poba-Nzaou, & Templier, 2013).
Currently, the Delphi method is used as a research instru-
ment within ﬁelds as diverse as the physical sciences,
engineering, education, public administration, biological
science, health care, business economics and policy making,
as well as sustainable development (Alyami, Rezgui, & Kwan,
2013). The key stages of the Delphi technique in this study
are (1) selection of the Delphi panel, (2) the development
of Delphi questionnaires, (3) data collection process and (4)
data analysis cooperated with SWOT implementation.
2.2. SWOT analysis
Since its inception in the early 1950s, SWOT analysis has
been used with increasing success as a strategic planning
tool by both researchers and practitioners. The technique
is used to segregate environmental factors and forces into
internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportu-
nities and threats (Hatami-Marbini, Tavana, Hajipourc, Kangi,
& Kazemi, 2013). Conducting a SWOT analysis is a simple
but effective strategic planning tool to allow the organiza-
tion to be recognizant of these factors (Eslamipoor &
Sepehriar, 2013). Many researchers applied SWOT analy-
sis as an effective tool in strategy formulation that supports
strategic planning and decision-making (for more detail, see
Hosseini Nasab & Milani, 2012;Kajanus, Leskinen, Kurttila,
& Kangas, 2012). The initiating step for strategic planning
is creating the mission and targets of the organization, and
then the SWOT analysis, which is one of the instruments
for rearranging the strategy it shapes for the organization
that is tailored to its environment. Using this analysis, it is
possible to analyze ﬁrst the internal and external environ-
ments, and second the strategic decisions to be taken for
harmonizing the organization’s strengths with the oppor-
tunities of the environment (Sherej Shariﬁ, 2012; Tavana,
Pirdashti, Kennedy, Belaud, & Behzadian, 2012).
2.3. Hybrid Delphi–SWOT model
The hybrid Delphi–SWOT model proposed in this study
is used to develop an optimum strategy for the Caspian Sea
delamination to enhance the consensus on Caspian Sea legal
regime in future negotiations. Figure 3 presents the stra-
tegic planning model used in this study. It was a tri-
stepped process: 1) problem deﬁnition and phase design
by Delphi rounds to conclude, 2) evaluation phase applied
SWOT analysis to plot the ﬁnal strategy and 3) develop-
ment phase; also DMs completely agreed that the suggested
outline in Fig. 3 provided invaluable analysis aids and data
processing support.
3. Strategic planning model
3.1. Problem deﬁnition and design phase
3.1.1. Ambiguity of the geographical classiﬁcation of the
Caspian Sea
Existing international conventions are not readily ap-
plicable to the Caspian Sea as the international scientiﬁc and
political communities have not yet developed a consensus
over classifying the Caspian Sea as a sea or a lake. If Caspian
Sea is to be considered a lake, a condominium regimemight
be applicable under which no country has exclusive right
and a joint sovereignty will govern the lake. However, being
the largest enclosed water body on earth by area and having
oceanographic characteristics that are typical of seas put the
applicability of the Condominium regime into question. As
a sea, Caspian Sea could be divided using equidistance
median lines, based on the International Law of the Seas.
Under this law, also referred to as the ‘sectorial division’
method, each country has exclusive rights within its mar-
itime boundaries. During almost two decades of negotiations,
ﬁve major governing/sharing methods have been pro-
posed by the riparian states:
(1) Condominium status applying to both the surface and
the sea bed
(2) Division based on the International Law of the Seas
(3) Equal division, allocating 20% of the sea and the sea bed
to each state
(4) Division based on the old Soviet maps
(5) Division of the sea bed based on the International Law
of the Seas with Condominium status on the sea surface
(Madani et al., 2014; Sheikhmohammady & Madani,
2008)
Some researchers have been compared between the
above delimitation (Madani et al., 2014; Sheikhmohammady
et al., 2010, 2012; Sheikhmohammady &Madani, 2008),but
the division of the Caspian, with large economic beneﬁts
at stake, has not necessarily been amicable, and the dim-
inution of the role of public international law has given
greater roles to the principles of power and self-interest
(Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2011). Zimnitskaya and Geldern
(2011) show how andwhy public international law has failed
to provide solutions to the most pressing issues; what the
interests and legal positions of the primary littoral states
are; and how the urgency of exploiting the resources of the
Caspian and constructing pipelines to export them has led
to irresolvable wrangling and a rush to grab the resources.
In the end we seek to show that the entry onto the global
petroleummarket has, paradoxically, led to a weakening of
public international law in the post-Soviet space.
To achieve the affected parameters on the Caspian Sea
delimitation, ﬁrst a set of closed seas with similar geo-
graphical features, which have already solved delimitation,
have been chosen, and then all the information was col-
lected and synthesized from different points of views
(Table 1). Then the most desirable factors that had grave in-
ﬂuence on delimitation were chosen based on literature
research and expert opinions.
For example Lake Tanganyika is the longest lake in the
world, and a variety of factors, in concert, make Lake Tan-
ganyika an exceptionally rich and interesting ecosystem.
Tanganyika is famous for their endemic species ﬂocks of
cichlid ﬁshes, such as Lakes Malawi/Nyasa and Victoria. The
African cichlid ﬁsh are the largest and most diverse radia-
tion of vertebrates on earth. The countries of Burundi,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Zambia share
Lake Tanganyika. These four countries are among the poorest
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in the world. All of these countries need to use this
resource, but the most important factor is sustainability de-
velopment. For this, many national and international
agencies have been put forward over the years to explain
the extraordinary delimitation patterns in Lake Tang-
anyika. Finally, of the lake’s shoreline perimeter, 9% is in
Burundi, 43% is in D.R. Congo, 36% is in Tanzania, and 12%
is in Zambia (Fig. 4) (West, 2001).
Another example is the dispute between the Republic
of Malawi (“Malawi”) and the United Republic of Tanzania
(“Tanzania”) concerning the location of the border between
the two states on or at the perimeter of Lake Nyasa/Malawi
(“the Lake”). The Lake is the third largest in Africa, sitting
at the bottom of the Great African Rift Valley and covering
approximately 29,600 square kilometers. The Lake’s shore-
line runs around westernMozambique, easternMalawi, and
southern Tanzania. The contestation relates to whether the
boundary demarcating the parties’ sovereign territory or ter-
ritorial waters runs along the middle of the Lake, or along
the Lake’s eastern shoreline of the territory of Tanzania. The
dispute, therefore, relates to whether Tanzania or Malawi
exercises sovereignty over the eastern half of the north-
ern part of the Lake separating Tanzania and Malawi. The
border dispute escalated in 2011 when Malawi awarded oil
exploration licenses covering the disputed part of the Lake
to Surestream Petroleum. Tanzanians depend on the Lake
for food, transportation and other daily needs. The aggra-
vation of Malawi’s distribution of exploration rights based
upon unilateral assertion of sovereignty elevates the parties’
interests by signaling potentially lucrative sources of gov-
ernment revenue. Possible resource extraction also signals
potential threats to local and regional commercial, cultur-
al and environmental interests. Further, failure of the parties
to resolve the dispute via peaceful means may also lead to
Fig. 3. Strategic planning model.
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local and potentially regional insecurity, further harming the
parties’ aforementioned interests. The dispute is compli-
cated by historical shifts in the positions of the parties and
the former colonial powers. Tanzania was a German colony
until 1919 when it was awarded to Britain under the Treaty
of Versailles, making it, like Malawi (then Nyasaland), a
British territory. While the British colonial view of the
boundary may have been inconsistent, the German and
British authorities had formally agreed under the 1890 He-
ligoland Treaty (“the Treaty”) that the border ran along the
Lake’s eastern shoreline (Banda, 2013; Mahony et al., 2014).
The effect of these problems on Caspian Sea delimitation
is very critical because of the huge oil and gas resource, and
the unexampled characteristics of the Caspian Sea. All
experts, whether national or international, were character-
ized for the expert panel construction. One hundred eighty-
seven deferent major factors were identiﬁed and generated,
which were effective on the closed sea delimitation as an
input to Delphi panel. In the ﬁrst step, the DMs began their
discussion of the issues relevant to developing strategic plan
for optimizing the consensus on the Caspian Sea legal
regime. Based on these discussions, the DMs collectively
decided to consider the economic, political, environmen-
tal, cultural, social, geomorphological, geographical status,
security–military, and hydro-climatic issues. The next steps
involved a series of Delphi rounds to ﬁnd a series of key rel-
evant criteria for use in SWOT analysis. In the ﬁrst Delphi
round, the DMswere asked individually to consider the eco-
nomic, political, environmental, cultural, social,
geomorphological, geographical status, security–military, and
hydro-climatic issues discussed in Step 1 and to compile a
set of factors considered to be important in the delimita-
tion decision. These personal lists were provided to the
facilitator anonymously. Then, the facilitator combined all
of these factors into a list with 187 factors. In round 2, this
list was shared with all the DMs. They were asked to con-
sider this feedback and then revise and resubmit their initial
individual list. The facilitator combined all of these factors
into a new list with 96 factors. Again in round 3, the syn-
thesized list of factors from round 2 was shared with all the
DMs, and they were asked to revise and resubmit their in-
dividual list from round 2. These Delphi rounds were
repeated three more times. In round 3, based on these dis-
cussions, the DMs collectively classiﬁed the 74 factors
developed in Step 3 into economics (11), political (8), en-
vironmental (9), cultural (5), social (10), geomorphological
(10), geographical status (6), security–military (7), and
hydro-climatic (8) categories (Table 2). At this rate DMs
Table 1
A set of major closed seas in the world (Wangs, 1992; Zacklin, 1981).
No. Name of lake Basin countries Maritime boundary Surface
elevation
(m)
Surface
area
(km2)
Width
(km2)
Length
(km)
Depth
(m)
1 Caspian Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
– −28 371,000 435 1,030 1,025
2 Huron United States, Canada Middle line – 59,600 295 – 59
3 Superior United States, Canada Middle line 2012 82,100 260 4,387 147
4 Michigan–Huron United States, Canada Middle line 176 117,400 – 8,792 281
5 Erie United States, Canada Stretches the boundary 176 25,667 92 388 19
6 Ontario United States, Canada Stretches the boundary 74 19,000 85 311 244
7 Constance Bodensee Germany, Switzerland, Austria Middle line 395 536 14 63 90
8 Geneva Switzerland, France Stretches the boundary 372 – 14 – 154.4
9 Peipus Estonia, Russia, Latvia, Belarus Stretches the boundary 30 3,555 – – 7.1
10 Albert Congo, Uganda Middle line 615 5,300 30 160 25
11 Edward Congo, Uganda Stretches the boundary 912 2,325 40 77 17
12 Chad Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria Combinatorial 278 1,350 – 650 1.5
13 Kivu Rwanda, Congo Stretches the boundary 1,460 2,700 48 89 240
14 Malawi Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania Combinatorial 500 29,600 75 560 292
15 Mweru Zambia, Congo Stretches the boundary 917 5,120 56 131 7.5
16 Tanganyika Tanzania, Congo, Burundi, and
Zambia
Stretches the boundary 773 32,900 50 – 570
17 Victoria Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya Combinatorial 1,133 68,800 250 337 40
18 Aral Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Middle line 138 1,274 – – 8.70
19 Uvs Mongolia, Russia Middle line 759 3,350 79 84 6.00
20 Khanka Russia, China Middle line 70 4,070 45 90 4.5
21 Memphremagog Canada, United States Middle line 208 102 – 21 15,5
22 Prespa Albania, Greece, Macedonia Stretches the boundary 853 259 – – 54
23 Båvrojávrre Norway and Sweden Stretches the boundary 6.08 6.08 1,5 8 –
+24 Brenets Chaillexon France, Switzerland Stretches the boundary 750 0/8 250 3,5 25
25 Lago di Lei Italy, Switzerland Stretches the boundary 1,931 4.12 – 7.7 133
26 Litlumvatnet Norway and Sweden Stretches the boundary 629 5.24 2 4 –
27 Ranseren Norway and Sweden Stretches the boundary 803 2.75 1 5 –
28 Maggiore Italy, Switzerland Middle line 193 212.5 10 66 177.4
29 Moron Switzerland, France Middle line 716 0.69 – 3.3 59
30 Doiran Greece, Macedonia Stretches the boundary 148 43.1 7.1 8.9 10
31 San Martín Argentina, Chile Stretches the boundary 250 1,013 – 525 836
32 Titicaca Bolivia, Peru Combinatorial 3,812 8,372 80 190 107
33 Nasser Egypt, Sudan Stretches the boundary 183 5,250 35 550 25.2
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approved the validity of this list. So a decision was made
to use the 74 factors issued in Table 2 in the subsequent
steps. Then the DMs began their discussion of the rele-
vant issues that affected the delimitation of closed sea in
face-to-face brainstorming sessions. Based on the vast
amount of information concerning the closed sea delimi-
tation conditions, the DMs are determined the factors weight
shown in Table 3. Also, the ﬁve coastal countries have been
weighted based on these factors. The factor weights were
achieved for each of the 74 components and the ﬁve coun-
tries as below:
For each criteria:
wi
i
n
=
∑ =
1
1 (1)
where n is the number of criteria.
The above formula was applied to weigh the subcriteria
where n is the number of subcriteria.
For each country respected to each subcriteria:
wi
i=
∑ =
1
5
1 (2)
3.2. Evaluation phase
SWOT analysis of external opportunities and threats, as
well as the internal strengths and weaknesses of the en-
terprises, is important for strategy formulation and
development. The analysis of external opportunities and
threats was targeting evaluation of whether an invest-
ment is able to seize opportunities and avoid threats under
uncontrolled external environment, such as waving prices,
political destabilization, social transition, and change in the
rule of law. And the goal of internal evaluation is to ﬁgure
out how an investment performs its internal tasks, such as
management, work eﬃciency, research and development,
etc. (Chang & Huang, 2006). Matching key internal and ex-
ternal factors is the hardest and challenging part of
generating a SWOTmatrix and requires the discretion of the
practitioner (Sevkli et al., 2012). DMs arranged a classiﬁ-
cation of external or internal for the categories identiﬁed
in the last phase. Then the DMs classiﬁed external factors
into two subcategories of opportunities and threats and in-
ternal factors into subcategories of strengths and
weaknesses. Of the 74 factors presented in Table 3, 30 were
classiﬁed as external and 34 were categorized as internal.
Within the external factors, 15 were perceived as oppor-
tunities and 15 as threats. Within the internal factors, 27
were identiﬁed as strengths and 17 as weaknesses. The
balance of factors between external and internal and threats
and opportunities suggests a defensive position in reac-
tion to external threats rather than an offensive orientation
in the SWOT analysis. Those who participated in this
program have been the subject of a survey by a follow-up
questionnaire wherein they were asked to score the factors
in each category on a scale of 0 to 1, with a 0.1 raise, where
a score of 0 indicates no signiﬁcant and a score of 1 indi-
cates extremely signiﬁcant. Table 3 presents the important
weight assigned by each DM along with an average for the
all DMs. Then, for recognition of the key factors, the overall
gap was calculated:
Overall Gap Factor weight sub-factor weight
Costal countr
= ×
×
(
ies weights −( ))0 2. (3)
Then the DMs decided to annihilate those factors that
they ﬁnd moderately insigniﬁcant. For this reason, the DMs
Fig. 4. Lake Tanganyika and its riparian nations: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Zambia.
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Table 2
Group classiﬁcation of the synthesized factors.
Factor Sub-factor SWOT
Economical (11) ECN01 Financial support of the international community Opportunity
ECN02 Financial support of the regional countries Opportunity
ECN03 Fossil energy resources Strength
ECN04 High level of GDP Strength
ECN05 Economic dependency Weakness
ECN06 Tourists accessibility potentials Strength
ECN07 Fisheries resource Strength
ECN08 Ability to ﬁnding, drilling, exploration and transportation of oil and gas Strength
ECN09 Financial investment of international community Opportunity
ECN10 Financial investment of national countries Opportunity
ECN11 Maritime transportation Strength
Political (8) POL01 Political support of the international community Opportunity
POL02 Political support of the neighboring countries Opportunity
POL03 Possibility of Russian control Threat
POL04 Political stability Strength
POL05 Diplomatic relations Strength
POL06 Historical disagreements Threat
POL07 Free and active election systems Strength
POL08 Political movements situation Strength
Environmental (9) ENI01 Biocide pollutions Threat
ENI02 Sea water remediation Threat
ENI03 Contamination persistence Threat
ENI04 Species animal extinctions Threat
ENI05 Marine ecosystem changes Threat
ENI06 Aquatic species extinctions (except Caviar) Threat
ENI07 Sea pollution by oil and gas exploration, reﬁnery, and transportation Threat
ENI08 The increased risk of contaminants entering Threat
ENI09 Caviar resources extinctions Threat
Cultural (5) CUL01 Racial similarities in the region Opportunity
CUL02 Linguistic similarities in the region Opportunity
CUL03 Religious similarities in the region Opportunity
CUL04 Historical similarities in the region Opportunity
CUL05 National customs similarities in the region Opportunity
Social (10) SOC01 Familiarity of the society with delimitation law Strength
SOC02 Open society Strength
SOC03 High population density Strength
SOC04 Social activity movements Strength
SOC05 Social welfare Strength
SOC06 Social gaps and discriminations Weakness
SOC07 Ethnic composition Strength
SOC08 Religious composition Strength
SOC09 Racial composition Strength
SOC10 Linguistic composition Strength
Geomorphological (10) GEOMO01 Offshore concave shape Weakness
GEOMO02 Continental shelf size and extension Weakness
GEOMO03 Coastal marshes and swamps shaping Weakness
GEOMO04 Coastal bays and estuaries, cuts, and subduction Weakness
GEOMO05 Entry ﬁgure and delta estuarine waters Weakness
GEOMO06 Coastal geomorphology (including bed, slope, depth and so on) Weakness
GEOMO07 Bed geomorphology (including bed, slope, depth and so on) Weakness
GEOMO08 Tectonic movements (fault and earthquake) Weakness
GEOMO09 Sedimentary types (size, color and volume) Weakness
GEOMO10 Island existence Strength
Geographical Status (6) GEOS01 Mathematical status Strength
GEOS02 Relative position Strength
GEOS03 Accessibility to open sea and oceans Strength
GEOS04 Neighbor countries extension Strength
GEOS05 Poorly and asymmetric shaped Weakness
GEOS06 Offshore length Strength
Security–military (7) SEMI01 Military powers Strength
SEMI02 Military support of the international community Opportunity
SEMI03 Military support of the neighboring countries Opportunity
SEMI04 Terrorism extension potentials Threat
SEMI05 Drug traﬃcking potentials Threat
SEMI06 Human and good traﬃcking Threat
SEMI07 Civil war risk potentials Threat
Hydro-climatic (8) HYCL01 Suitable climate Strength
HYCL 02 Sea currents Weakness
HYCL 03 River ﬂow problems Weakness
HYCL 04 Problem of variable water level Weakness
HYCL 05 Importance of sea water Opportunity
HYCL 06 High volume of incoming water Opportunity
HYCL 07 Problem of high levels evaporation Weakness
HYCL 08 Problems of concentration and salinity Weakness
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Table 3
Important weights.
Factor Weights Sub-factor Weights Coastal countries (normalized weights)
(Middle weight = 0.20)
Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Russia Turkmenistan
Economical (11) 0.11 ECN01 0.10 0.34 0.07 0.28 0.10 0.21
ECN02 0.08 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.22
ECN03 0.15 0.20 0.07 0.50 0.10 0.14
ECN04 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.45 0.09
ECN05 0.09 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.06 0.27
ECN06 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.30 0.15
ECN07 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.13
ECN08 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.38 0.11
ECN09 0.10 0.32 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.19
ECN10 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.12
ECN11 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.35 0.10
Political (8) 0.14 POL01 0.18 0.32 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.19
POL02 0.16 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.17
POL03 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25
POL04 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.17
POL05 0.11 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.21
POL06 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.16
POL07 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.17
POL08 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.17
Environmental (9) 0.07 ENI01 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.45 0.09
ENI02 0.08 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.13
ENI03 0.10 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.13
ENI04 0.10 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.12
ENI05 0.10 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.12
ENI06 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.12
ENI07 0.11 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.23 0.20
ENI08 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.29 0.17
ENI09 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.12
Cultural (5) 0.09 CUL01 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.20
CUL02 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.26
CUL03 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.24
CUL04 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.18
CUL05 0.17 0.31 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19
Social (10) 0.05 SOC01 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.10
SOC02 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.12
SOC03 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.08
SOC04 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.12
SOC05 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.29
SOC06 0.08 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.18
SOC07 0.12 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.3
SOC08 0.10 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.31
SOC09 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.29
SOC10 0.12 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.29
Geomorphological (10) 0.18 GEOMO01 0.08 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.17 0.14
GEOMO02 0.10 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.17 0.14
GEOMO03 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.17
GEOMO04 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.19 0.21
GEOMO05 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.16
GEOMO06 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.21
GEOMO07 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.22 0.21
GEOMO08 0.05 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19
GEOMO09 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19
GEOMO10 0.13 0.31 0.06 0.39 0.16 0.08
Geographical status (6) 0.19 GEOS01 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.13 0.07 0.20
GEOS02 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.27 0.20
GEOS03 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.56 0.11
GEOS04 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.45 0.09
GEOS05 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.32 0.20 0.24
GEOS06 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.27 0.20
Security–military (7) 0.10 SEMI01 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.68 0.03
SEMI02 0.15 0.42 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.21
SEMI03 0.17 0.40 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.20
SEMI04 0.13 0.23 0.08 0.19 0.38 0.12
SEMI05 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.24
SEMI06 0.10 0.27 0.09 0.18 0.36 0.09
SEMI07 0.14 0.24 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.08
Hydro-climatic (8) 0.07 HYCL01 0.09 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.21
HYCL02 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.30 0.15
HYCL03 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.09
HYCL04 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.30 0.24 0.18
HYCL05 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.29
HYCL06 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.43 0.09
HYCL07 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.32
HYCL08 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.09 0.31
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agreed to use a threshold of 0.001 out of a possible 1.0. Forty-
four factors, including ﬁfteen opportunities, ten threats, ten
strengths and nine weaknesses, had a weight of 0.001 or
greater, dispersed into ﬁve coastal countries: six factors for
Azerbaijan, eighteen factors for Iran, ten factors for Kazakh-
stan, twenty factors for Russia and twelve factors for
Turkmenistan. Some of these factors are alike for two coun-
tries, but their weights for all of them have differences based
on their conditions. This resulted in a more manageable
number of factors for the DMs to consider and a balance
between the external and internal factors in the SWOT anal-
ysis. Table 4(A–E) shows the coastal countries according to
key factors with │Overall Gap│ ≥ 0.001.
3.3. Strategy development phase
Strategy development is a very sensitive and complex
procedure in which the alternatives are evaluated and the
organization’s resources are applied to achieve its mission
(Li, Davies, Edwards, Kinman, & Duan, 2002). Due to un-
certainty and perceived equivocation, developing strategy
requires input and cooperation from many organizational
functions and DMs (Eden, 1990; Li, Kinman, Duan, &
Edwards, 2000; Mintzberg, 1994a, 1994b; Porter, 1987).
SWOT analysis aims to identify the strengths and weak-
nesses of an organization and the opportunities and threats
in the environment. To be aware of these factors can lead
to developing strategies that may booster the strengths and
annihilate the weaknesses, seize the opportunities, and
counter the threats. An internal evaluation will reveal the
strength and weaknesses of the organization and the ex-
ternal evaluation will do the same for opportunities and
threat (Dyson, 2004).After these evaluations and selecting
process, the DMs met to discuss the conclusions and ﬁnal-
ize its recommendations. Next, the DMs arranged a series
of additional face-to-face meetings to develop a set of strat-
egies for exploiting the 44 critical success factors identiﬁed
in the SWOT analysis. In three meetings, the DMs pro-
posed 44 strategies corresponding to the theme in one of
the critical SWOT factors. The proposed strategies are pre-
sented in Table 5.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian
Sea littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and
Turkmenistan) have elevated from moderate equivocation
to a remarkable distinction in international affairs. The
Caspian Sea is a unique geographical and geopolitical phe-
nomenon that requires a special international legal regime.
Nowadays there is no substantial legal regime that is ac-
ceptable and applicable to coastal countries because the
existing legal regime, which is based on the Russian So-
cialist Federal Republic and Persia (after 1935, Iran) on 26
February 1921, is not adequate to cope with today’s polit-
ical, economic, environmental and other problems.
One of the important factors that have increased the
tension between Iran, Russia and the other littoral states is
that it gives great weight to general Soviet–Iranian trea-
ties that make little mention of the Caspian, and are
completely silent about division or ownership of the seabed.
Table 4
(A): Selected optimal hyper-parameters of SWOT model for Azerbaijan
(│Overall Gap│ ≥ 0.001). (B): Selected optimal hyper-parameters of SWOT
model for Iran (│Overall Gap│ ≥ 0.001). (C): Selected optimal hyper-
parameters of SWOTmodel for Kazakhstan (│Overall Gap│ ≥ 0.001). (D):
Selected optimal hyper-parameters of SWOT model for Russia (│Overall
Gap│ ≥ 0.001). (E): Selected optimal hyper-parameters of SWOT model
for Turkmenistan (│Overall Gap│ ≥ 0.001).
Ranking Sub-factor SWOT Overall gap
A
1 GEOS06 Strength 0.0054
2 SEMI01 Strength 0.0029
3 GEOS04 Strength 0.0023
4 GEOS03 Strength 0.0022
5 POL03 Weakness 0.0019
6 ENI07 Weakness 0.0015
B
1 POL06 Threat 0.0048
2 GEOS02 Strength 0.0040
3 GEOMO02 Weakness 0.0036
4 POL01 Opportunity 0.0035
5 GEOMO10 Strength 0.0033
6 GEOMO01 Weakness 0.0029
7 GEOS06 Strength 0.0029
8 GEOS03 Strength 0.0022
9 ECN03 Strength 0.0021
10 SEMI03 Opportunity 0.0020
11 POL03 Threat 0.0019
12 CUL02 Opportunity 0.0019
13 SEMI02 Opportunity 0.0018
14 SEMI01 Strength 0.0017
15 POL05 Strength 0.0015
16 ECN01 Opportunity 0.0014
17 ECN09 Opportunity 0.0012
18 ECN02 Opportunity 0.0011
C
1 GEOS05 Weakness 0.0048
2 HYCL 04 Weakness 0.0028
3 GEOMO07 Weakness 0.0024
4 GEOMO04 Weakness 0.0023
5 GEOS01 Strength 0.0023
6 GEOS03 Strength 0.0022
7 GEOMO06 Weakness 0.0019
8 POL03 Threat 0.0019
9 GEOMO03 Weakness 0.0016
10 SEMI01 Strength 0.0011
D
1 GEOS01 Strength 0.0042
2 SEMI07 Threat 0.0028
3 CUL03 Opportunity 0.0028
4 SEMI04 Threat 0.0026
5 ENI09 Threat 0.0024
6 HYCL03 Weakness 0.0021
7 GEOMO03 Weakness 0.0020
8 ENI01 Threat 0.0018
9 SEMI02 Opportunity 0.0018
10 POL01 Opportunity 0.0018
11 ENI06 Threat 0.0017
12 ECN03 Strength 0.0017
13 ENI04 Threat 0.0014
14 ENI05 Threat 0.0014
15 SEMI06 Threat 0.0013
16 ENI08 Threat 0.0013
17 GEOMO05 Weakness 0.0012
18 ECN02 Opportunity 0.0011
19 HYCL 04 Weakness 0.0011
20 ECN01 Opportunity 0.0011
E
1 SEMI01 Strength 0.0032
2 GEOMO10 Strength 0.0028
3 GEOS04 Strength 0.0023
4 GEOS03 Strength 0.0022
5 POL03 Threat 0.0019
6 ECN05 Weakness 0.0017
7 GEOS05 Weakness 0.0016
8 HYCL 07 Weakness 0.0015
9 HYCL 08 Weakness 0.0013
10 ECN08 Strength 0.0012
11 HYCL 06 Opportunity 0.0012
12 ECN03 Strength 0.0010
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Considering that the primary concern of the littoral states
is the division of the seabed and the resources in it, the trea-
ties appear to be useless. Iran argues for a common
ownership regime of the Caspian’s resources when in fact
such a regime is not explicit in the treaties. Such a common
ownership regime would, therefore, have to be inferred, but
neither the Soviet Union nor Iran treated the Caspian as joint
property during the Soviet era. The Soviets engaged in oil
extraction activities outside the ten-mile exclusive ﬁshing
zone stipulated in the treaty, with no objection from Iran.
Some have suggested that Iran’s silence about de facto di-
visions during the Soviet era should preclude it from raising
objections to national divisions today. Finally, Iran has
refused to recognize the continued validity of the 1921 and
1940 treaties in other areas they govern, such as security.
Although the littoral states around the Caspianmay feel free
to lay claims of exclusive jurisdiction over some sectors, “the
legality of such claims may be tested by Iran as a matter
of international law”. The lack of a systematic approach to
the issue of competing sovereign rights of the littoral states,
and the absence of an international adjudicative body with
jurisdiction, is doomed to result in chaos, with an armed
conﬂict lurking in the wings (Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2011).
The Caspian Sea delimitation is a complex multi-criteria
problemwith conﬂicting objectives. It is hard to say for sure
which delimitation is the best, but wemade an optimal stra-
tegic planning by a hybrid model combining SWOT analysis
with the Delphi method to assist the coastal countries’ ne-
gotiators to reach a signiﬁcant consensus on the legal status
and regime problems. The model decomposed the proce-
Table 5
Key strategies.
Ranking Sub-factor Strategies
1 CUL02 O To promote common language with the Caspian regional countries
2 CUL03 O To promote common religion with the Caspian regional countries
3 ECN01 O To improve ﬁnancial relations with ultra-regional powers
4 ECN02 O To improve ﬁnancial relations with neighboring powers
5 ECN09 O To create better conditions for attracting foreign investment
6 HYCL06 O To introduce capabilities of high volume of incoming water with more detailed and factual information
7 POL01 O To improve political relations with ultra-regional powers
8 SEMI02 O To improve military relations with ultra-regional powers
9 SEMI03 O To improve military relations with regional powers
10 ENI01 T To prevent the biocide pollutions
11 ENI04 T To prevent the species animal extinctions
12 ENI05 T To prevent the marine ecosystem changes
13 ENI06 T To prevent the aquatic species extinctions (except Caviar)
14 ENI08 T To prevent the sea pollution by oil and gas exploration, reﬁnery, and transportation
15 ENI09 T To reduce the increased risk of contaminants entering
16 POL06 T To remedy the restrict historical disagreement
17 SEMI04 T To prevent further terrorist attacks
18 SEMI06 T To prevent further human and good traﬃcking
19 SEMI07 T To prevent further civil war risk potentials
20 ECN03 S To introduce fossil energy resources with more detailed and factual information
21 ECN08 S To strengthen the ability to ﬁnding, drilling, exploration and transportation of oil and gas
22 GEOMO10 S To introduce capabilities of the existed island with more detailed and factual information
23 GEOS01 S To introduce capabilities of the mathematical status with more detailed and factual information
24 GEOS02 S To introduce capabilities of the relative position with more detailed and factual information
25 GEOS03 S To introduce capabilities of the accessibility to open sea and oceans with more detailed and factual information
26 GEOS04 S To introduce capabilities of the neighbor countries’ extension with more detailed and factual information
27 GEOS06 S To introduce capabilities of the offshore length with more detailed and factual information
28 POL05 S To strengthen the diplomatic relations
29 SEMI01 S To improve the military services
30 ECN05 W To strengthen economic independency
31 ENI07 W To prevent the sea pollution by oil and gas exploration, reﬁnery, and transportation
32 GEOMO01 W To introduce condition of the offshore concave shape with more detailed and factual information
33 GEOMO02 W To introduce condition of the continental shelf size and extension with more detailed and factual information
34 GEOMO03 W To introduce condition of the coastal marshes and swamps shaping with more detailed and factual information
35 GEOMO04 W To introduce condition of the coastal bays and estuaries, cuts, and subduction with more detailed and factual
information
36 GEOMO05 W To introduce condition of the entry ﬁgure and delta estuarine waters with more detailed and factual information
37 GEOMO06 W To introduce condition of the coastal geomorphology (including bed, slope, depth and so on) with more detailed and
factual information
38 GEOMO07 W To introduce condition of the bed geomorphology (including bed, slope, depth and so on) with more detailed and
factual information
39 GEOS05 W To introduce condition of the poorly and asymmetric shaped with more detailed and factual information
40 HYCL 04 W To introduce condition of the problem of variable water level with more detailed and factual information
41 HYCL 07 W To introduce condition of the problem of high levels of evaporation with more detailed and factual information
42 HYCL 08 W To introduce condition of the problems of concentration and salinity with more detailed and factual information
43 HYCL03 W To introduce condition of the problems of concentration and salinity with more detailed and factual information
44 POL03 W To strengthen the political dependency
O, opportunity; T, threat; S, strength; W, weakness.
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dure into several steps and applied extracted key factors and
developed key strategy from a set of closed seas with similar
geographical features, which have already solved delimi-
tation. For example a subcriterion that was suggested by the
experts as an input to the model is Sea pollution by oil and
gas exploration, reﬁnery, and transportation subjected to
ENI07. After SWOT analysis this item (importance ranking
33/44) was a weakness for Azerbaijan, and the recom-
mended strategy was that this country should prevent sea
pollution by oil and gas exploration, reﬁnery, and trans-
portation before the consensus on Caspian Sea legal regime.
This strategy is comparable to the international and African
organization request to change Malawi’s recent decision to
explore potential exploitation of the Lake’s resources that
became the tensions between coastal countries. It is of grave
importance to choose an optimal strategy that can lead to
proﬁt or loss. They were convinced that the conclusion was
unprejudiced and neutral and harmonious with their goals.
However, the beneﬁts of this model are yet nascent, and the
potential is gigantic. Our contribution just addresses the set
of problems that were recognized by DMswhowere mainly
Iranians. We are hopeful to be an inspiration for those who
want to peruse additional research. However, we are opti-
mistic that the legal status of the Caspian Sea will be deﬁned
in peaceful methods, which can be achieved by mobility,
concurrence and rationality of the actions of all Caspian bor-
dering states.
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